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I.

INTRODUCTION

Before the Japanese Constitution was adopted, the old Civil Code
under the Meiji Constitution governed family life in Japan. The old law did
*
Yuichiro Tsuji, Associate Professor of the Graduate School of Humanities and Social
Science (legal major) at the University of Tsukuba; J.S.D University of California, Berkeley; LL.M.
University of California, Berkeley; and Master of Law, Kyoto University. For a prior discussion on the
patricide case, See Yuichiro Tsuji, Constitutional Law Court in Japan, 66 TSUKUBA J.L. & POL. 65, 74
(2016), http://hdl.handle.net/2241/00137460 (Japan). The major parts of the Civil Code in Japan were
revised and promulgated in 2017 after submitting this paper. These changes will become effective
within three years. Special thanks to the Associate Dean and the professors at Chulalongkorn University
for this paper, and I am grateful to Ms. Nicole Villamar and members of the ILSA Journal of
International & Comparative Law for their support.
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not extend suffrage to women, who were also not recognized as being able
to conclude contracts. The eldest son, rather than the wife, inherited the
home and farm upon the death of the father. These traditions were derived
from the feudal system of the Edo period.
When the Japanese Constitution of 1947 replaced the Meiji
Constitution after World War II, universal suffrage was achieved, and
equality between men and women was declared in Article 14 of the new
constitution.1 In addition, Article 24 affirmed that a marriage may only
take place with the mutual consent of both the husband and wife. 2 The
marriage must be maintained through mutual cooperation and on the basis
of the equal rights of the husband and wife.3
Given these changes, it appears that the legal system that was
introduced with the new constitution resulted in reforming the Japanese
family law system. However, the judiciary has struggled against the current
of conventional and closed ideas in Japanese society. The most famous
case in this regard is the Supreme Court case known as the patricide case,
the facts of which are described later in this paper, which involved a girl
who was repeatedly raped by her own father.4 She was prosecuted under
Article 200 of the Criminal Code, which stipulated that a person who kills a
parent or a spouse’s parent is punishable by death or life imprisonment with
hard labor.5 At the same time, Article 199 of the Criminal Code stated that
a person who kills another person shall be punished with death or
imprisonment with hard labor for not less than three years.6 The Supreme
Court struck down Article 200 on the basis of Article 14 of the Constitution
and opined that the means of achieving the law’s goals were too harsh. 7
However, it took twenty-two years after this decision for the article to be
amended by legislature.8
This paper first reviews several cases involving human rights issues
that have arisen under Japanese family law and the constitution, including
1.

NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 14 (Japan).

2.

Id. art. 24.

3.

Id.

4

Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) SAIBANSHO
265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan).

SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB]

5.

KYŪ KEIHŌ [OLD PEN. C.] 1880, art. 200 (Japan).

6.

Id. art. 199.

7.

Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) SAIBANSHO
265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan).

SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB]

8.
KEIHŌ [PEN. C.] (Japan) (deleting art. 200 as last amended by Law No. 91, May 12, 1995);
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) SAIBANSHO SAIBANREI JŌHŌ
[SAIBANSHO WEB] 265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan).
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two relevant 2015 Supreme Court decisions. The Court upheld the
constitutionality of Article 750 of the Civil Code, which requires married
couples to choose either the husband’s or the wife’s family name,
emphasizing the tradition of couples using the same family name.9 On the
other hand, the court struck down Article 733 of the Civil Code, which
prohibited women from remarrying within six months of a divorce.10 The
court stated that 100 days was a reasonable period to wait before a woman
should be permitted to remarry.11
Second, focusing on the justices’ opinions in these two cases, this
paper will consider the constitutionality of these decisions and the Supreme
Court’s function of imposing its interpretations on the two other branches
of government: the executive and the legislative branches.
II.
A.

HISTORY OF THE STATUS OF FAMILY AND WOMEN UNDER
THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION

Drafting History of the Japanese Constitution

The Japanese Constitution was adopted on May 3, 1947.12 Under the
previous (Meiji) constitution, only male adult suffrage was guaranteed with
regard to the election of public officials, although women participated in the
general election of the Imperial Diet in 1946.13 Moreover, women were not

9.
KYŪ MINPŌ [OLD CIV. C.] 1898, art. 750 (Japan); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 16,
2015, Heisei 26 (o) no. 1023, 69(8) SAIBANSHO SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 2586,
http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan).
10.
KYŪ MINPŌ [OLD CIV. C.] 1898, art. 733 (Japan); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 16,
2015, Heisei 25 (o) no. 1079, 69(8) SAIBANSHO SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 2427,
http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan).
11.

Id.

12.

NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION] (Japan).

13.
Hiroko Tomida, The Association of New Women and its Contribution to the Japanese
Women’s Movement, 17 JAPAN F. 49, 49–51 (2005), http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10
.1080/0955580052000337468#aHR0cDovL3d3dy50YW5kZm9ubGluZS5jb20vZG9pL3BkZi8xMC4M
DgwLzA5NTU1ODAwNTIwMDAzMzc0Njg/bmVlZEFjY2Vzcz10cnVlQEBAMA. Public officials
were purged from public service on January 4, 1946, and universal suffrage was achieved on April 10 of
that year. Rebuilding of Political Parties and General Election, NAT’L DIET JAPAN: MODERN JAPAN IN
ARCHIVES, http://www.ndl.go.jp/modern/e/cha5/description05.html#c551 (last visited Nov. 5, 2017). In
spite of these prohibitions, and before the current constitution was established, Raichō Hiratsuka worked
to achieve universal suffrage around 1920, and Hiratsuka, Husae Ichikawa, and Mumeo Oku established
the New Women's Association (Shin Fujin Kyoukai). Tomida, supra note 13. See also DAI NIHON
TEIKOKU [MEIJI KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION] (Japan).
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able to form political associations or take part in political activities under
the Maintenance of Public Order Act, known as Chian Iji Hou.14
Also, under the old Civil Code15 and the Meiji Constitution, the eldest
son was the head of the family and succeeded to all property, including the
house and the land, when the head of the household passed away. 16
Married women were not competent to take legal action, and in a divorce,
women were not eligible for the right to the distribution of property.17 In
addition, only women were subject to criminal liability for adultery under
the old Criminal Code.18
When the United States General Headquarters (GHQ) and the
Japanese government worked together to propose the draft of the new
constitution, General Courtney Whitney hired Ms. Beate Sirota Gordon to
work on provisions related to human rights. 19 She advanced women’s
rights in the draft of the constitution.20 The provisions for women became
more advanced at that time, and the equality of men and women was legally
acknowledged. 21 The articles she drafted included those related to both
women and children. For example, pregnant women and women with
children would be protected under the new constitution and would be
subsidized when necessary. 22 Illegitimate children would not be legally
discriminated against and would be given the same rights as legitimate
children. 23 Adopting a child would require the consensus of both the
husband and wife, and the adopted child would be treated equally as a

14.
Chian Iji Hou [Maintenance of Public Order Act], Law No. 46 of 1925 (Japan) (The
Maintenance of Public Order Act is also sometimes called the Peace Preservation Law). See also
MASASHI TSUJIMOTO & YOKO YAMASAKI, THE HISTORY OF EDUCATION IN JAPAN (1600–2000) 71
(2017).
15.

KYŪ MINPŌ [OLD CIV. C.] 1898, art. 732, 749–51, 964 (Japan).

16.
Id. arts. 754–55, 807, 964(3) (noting that there was an exception for a female head of
household, although her authority was more limited than a male’s authority).
17.

Id. art. 732 (Japan).

18.
KYŪ KEIHŌ [OLD PEN. C.] 1880, art. 183 (Japan). This system was abolished by
amendments to the Civil and Criminal Codes in 1947. Kanako Takayama, Reform of the Criminal
Justice System in Japan, 82 INT’L REV. PEN. L. 245, 245 (2011); HISTORY OF LAW IN JAPAN SINCE 1868
297–98 (Wilhelm Röhl ed., 2005).
19.

BEATE SIROTA GORDON, THE ONLY WOMAN IN THE ROOM 104 (1st ed. 1997).

20.

Id. at 106.

21.
Id. at 107–08, 113–16, 125. Later, Ms. Gordon noted that the United States Constitution
did not have specific provisions for women’s rights. Id. at 107–08.
22.

GORDON, supra note 19, at 111.

23.

Id. at 117–18.
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member of the family.24 The privilege of the eldest son would be abolished,
and every child would be given equal opportunity in spite of the
circumstances of his or her birth. 25 Compulsory education would be
required for eight years in public school.26 Middle and higher education
would be provided free of charge.27 The government would be authorized
to support gifted children.28 All children would be eligible to receive free
medical treatment for their teeth and eyes.29 School-aged children could
not engage in full-time employment.30 Regarding adults, every adult person
would be given the right to pursue an occupation.31 If he or she could not
obtain it, the government would provide the necessary minimum financial
support.32 Women would be eligible for any occupation, including political
positions, and they would receive the same wage as that of males who
provided the same service.33
The Japanese government objected to Ms. Gordon’s drafts, because
the Japanese had no background to accept equality between men and
women. 34 However, this twenty-two-year-old woman’s opinion was
reflected in Articles 14 and 24 of the Japanese Constitution.35 She referred
to Articles 109, 119, and 122 of the Weimar Constitution, the First
Amendment of the United States (U.S.) Constitution, the Finland
Constitution, and the 1924 Soviet Constitution.36

24.

Id.

25.

Id.

26.

Id. at 118.

27.

GORDON, supra note 19, at 118

28.

Id.

29.

Id.

30.

Id.

31.

Id.

32.

GORDON, supra note 19, at 118.

33.
Id. See also MIYOKO TSUJIMURA, KENPŌ TO KAZOKU [CONSTITUTION AND FAMILY] 79–
84 (Nihon Kajo Shuppan 2016) (Japan).
34.
TATSUO SATO, NIHONKOKU KENPŌ SEITEI SI [HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN]
(Yuhikaku 1962) (Japan).
35.

See NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], arts. 14, 24 (Japan).

36.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.; Finland Constitution (Suomen perustuslaki), Ch. 2 § 6, 1999;
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNION OF SOCIALIST SOVIET REPUBLICS [SOVIET CONSTITUTION] Jan. 31, 1924
(Soviet Union); DIE VERFASSUNG DES DEUTSCHEN REICHS [WEIMAR CONSTITUTION] Aug. 11, 1919,
art. 109, 119, 122 (Ger.); GORDON, supra note 19, at 107–08.
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Three 1986 Statutes of Women in Society

A constitution typically binds the government in its relations with its
citizens but not the relationships of private citizens among themselves. It is
controversial when the constitution is applied to relationships between
private citizens. One famous case is the Nissan automobile case in which
Nissan set different retiring ages for males (sixty years old) and females
(fifty-five years old).37 The Supreme Court ruled the employment provision
void under Article 9038 of the Civil Code.39
The textbook on the Constitution of Japan classifies relationships
among private parties into three positions.40 The first position emphasizes
constitutional values and that constitutional norms are not directly
applicable to the relationship between publishers and authors.41 The second
position uses general basic provisions of the Civil Code to affect a
constitutional norm between private parties. 42 If a contract exists, the
constitutional norm applies through basic principles, such as the bona fide
(good faith) articles of the Civil Code used to interpret a contract.43 If there
is no contract, as in the case of a traffic accident, then principles that guide
public order and morality are applied.44
The third position recognizes no effect of a constitutional norm in
relationships between private parties. 45 Only statutes can assist with
providing a remedy. The Japanese Supreme Court has not clarified which
position it is likely to take.46 Currently, German constitutional theory is
37.

Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 24, 1982, Showa 54(o) no. 750, 35 SAIBANSHO
300, http://www.courts. go.jp (Japan).

SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB]

38.

MINPŌ [CIV. C.] art. 90 (Japan).

39.

Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 24, 1982, Showa 54(o) no. 750, 35 SAIBANSHO
300, http://www.courts. go.jp (Japan).

SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB]

40.
KOJI SATO, NIHON KOKU KENPŌ RON [JAPANESE CONSTITUTION] 164–69 (Seibundo
2011) (Japan) [hereinafter SATO 2011]; TOSHIHIKO NONAKA, MUTSUO NAKAMURA, KAZUYUKI
TAKAHASHI & KATSUTOSHI TAKAMI, KENPŌ I [CONSTITUTION I] 248–56 (Yuhikaku 2012) (Japan)
[hereinafter NONAKA ET AL. I].
41.

SATO 2011, supra note 40, at 165, 166–69; NONAKA ET AL. I, supra note 40, at 250–51.

42.

MINPŌ [CIV. C.] arts. 90, 709 (Japan).

43.

SATO 2011, supra note 40, at 165; NONAKA ET AL. I, supra note 40, at 249–50.

44.

SATO 2011, supra note 40, at 165; NONAKA ET AL. I, supra note 40, at 249–50.

45.

SATO 2011, supra note 40, at 165; NONAKA ET AL. I, supra note 40, at 249–50.

46.

Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 12, 1973, Showa 43 (o) no. 932, 27 SAIBANSHO
[SAIBANSHO WEB] 1536, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.]
July 19, 1974, Showa 42 (gyo tsu) no. 59, 28 SAIBANSHO SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 790,
http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan).
SAIBANREI JŌHŌ
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influential. Advocates of German constitutional studies argue that the state
has a duty and responsibility to protect the rights of private citizens against
infringement by a private third party.47
Shigenori Matsui argues that the three above-mentioned classifications
should be abandoned.48 Matsui classifies the relationship between statutes
and private parties into four types.49 The first type is when a specific statute
orders a certain action by a private party.50 The second is when a specific
statute authorizes a private citizen to act.51 The third occurs when there is
no statute.52 Finally, the fourth type occurs when a specific statute prohibits
a private citizen from acting. 53 Matsui argues that the “public welfare”
doctrine would apply in the first and second cases.54 In the fourth case, no
state responsibility arises.55 In the third case, private action is permitted
and not prohibited by any statute.56
Even after the Japanese Constitution was adopted, the gender role
model in the family was partially maintained. Court decisions and the
Japanese legal system, which are based on civil law, have influenced the
lives of people as well. For the family environment in Japan, three statutes
enacted in 1986 promoted the social status of women, addressed lifestyle
and work life, and provided opportunities for women to work outside.57
47.
TAKESHI OYAMA, KIHONKEN HOGO NO HŌRI [PRINCIPLE REGARDING PROTECTION OF
BASIC RIGHTS] (Seibundo 1998) (Japan); see also SATO 2011, supra note 40, at 168.
48.
SHIGENORI MATSUI, NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN] 325–26 (Yuhikaku
2007) (Japan).
49.

Id.

50.

Id.

51.

Id.

52.

Id.

53.

MATSUI, supra note 48.

54.

Id.

55.

Id.

56.

Id. at 324.

57.
Danjo Koyō Kikai Kintou Hou [Act on Securing Equal Employment Opportunity and
Treatment Between Men and Women in Employment], Law No. 113 of 1972, translated in (Japanese
Law Translation [JLT DS]), http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp [hereinafter Danjo]; Roudousha
Haken Jidyou no Tekiseina Uneino Kakuho Oyobi Haken Roudousha no hogo tou ni Kansuru Houritsu
[Act for Securing the Proper Operation of Worker Dispatching Undertakings and Improved Working
Conditions for Dispatched Workers], Law No. 88 of 1985, translated in (Japanese Law Translation [JLT
DS]), http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp [hereinafter Roudousha] (noting this act is sometimes
also called the Temporary Staffing Services Law (emphasis added)); Kokumin Nenkin-hō [National
Pension Law], Law No. 141 of 1947, translated in (Japanese Law Translation [JLT DS]),
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp (as amended in 1959, and again in 2012 by Law No. 99)
[hereinafter Kokumin].
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First, the Equal Employment Opportunity Law (Danjo Koyo Kikai
Kintou Hou) prohibits gender discrimination in the workplace. 58 Its
purpose was to promote equality in recruitment, employment, and
retirement or dismissal. 59 In 1997, this law was partially amended and
regulations to protect women, such as the prohibition of overtime or
midnight work, were abolished.60 According to its original goal, however,
the revised act does still require legally equal treatment in recruitment,
employment, and retirement or dismissal.61
Second, the Temporary Staffing Services Law (Roudousha Haken
Jigyou no Tekiseina Uneino Kakuho Oyobi Haken Roudousha no hogo tou
ni Kansuru Houritsu) provides for certain employment conditions and
guarantees the rights of employees.62 Employers typically hire temporary
workers at cheaper rates than regular workers. Workers can choose flexible
working styles. This Temporary Staffing Services Law has been amended
several times.63 The 2006 revised Act provided an extension of part time
workers’ contracts, as well as improvements to welfare expenses.64
Third, the National Pension Act provides tax reductions for female
homemakers who belong to Category III Insured as defined by the National
Pension (Kokumin-Nenkin-Dai-San-Gou-Hi-Hokensha).65
Only those with income under 1.3 million yen receive a tax reduction
for filing income taxes as a husband’s dependent. 66 This law classifies
people in Japan into three categories. Category I is for self-employed
persons, students, and unemployed persons. 67 Category II is for public
officials or salaried workers.68 Persons in this category receive the common
national pension in addition to a welfare pension. 69 Category III is for
unemployed wives of persons in Category II.70 Unemployed wives do not
58.

Danjo, supra note 57, at art. 5.

59.

Id. art. 1.

60.

Id. arts. 27–31.

61.

Id. arts. 5–6.

62.

Roudousha, supra note 57.

63.
Id. (noting that the Temporary Staffing Services Law was amended in 1999 and 2006
(emphasis added)).
64.

Id. art. 40(2) (as most recently amended by Law No. 82 in 2016).

65.

Kokumin, supra note 57, at art. 7(3).

66.

Id.

67.

Id. art. 7(1).

68.

Id. art. 7(2).

69.

Id. (noting, for example, that public officials need to pay welfare insurance premium).

70.

Kokumin, supra note 57, at art. 7(3).
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have to pay tax, because they are their husbands’ dependents for the
purpose of receiving a pension.71 If the wives work outside the home and
earn over 1.3 million yen, they must pay employee pension and social
insurance premiums.72
Another limitation has prevented wives from working outside of the
home, a spousal deduction for housewives who can claim the deduction as
long as their income is less than 1.3 million yen a year. 73 Japanese
housewives have been reluctant to earn more than 1.3 million yen a year.
The obligation to pay higher taxes associated with higher earnings may
limit their revenue-making capacity when they decide to work outside the
home.
In late 2016, the Japanese government revised the spouse dependent
deduction from 1.3 to 1.5 million yen per year.74 This revision requires
companies to change their regulations in order for spouses to receive
additional payments. 75 This is a reflection that family life in Japan is
changing.
III.

DECISIONS UNDER THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION

The Supreme Court is the last and highest court in the judiciary under
the Japanese Constitution.76 Japanese lower courts have concrete judicial
review under Article 81 of the Japanese Constitution. 77 The judiciary
reviews disputes of law under the Court Act.78

71.

Id.

72.
Haigūsha Kōjo [Spouse Deduction], National Tax Agency Regulation No. 1191 of 2014,
http://www.nta.go.jp/taxanswer/shotoku/1191.htm (Japan).
73.

Id.; see also Kokumin, supra note 57, at art. 7(3).

74.
Haigūsha Kōjo Oyobi Haigūsha Tokubetsu Kōjo no Minaosi ni Tsuite [About Revision of
Spouse Deduction and Spouse Special Deduction], NAT’L TAX AGENCY, https://www.nta.go.jp/
gensen/haigusya/index.htm (Japan) (last visited Nov. 5, 2017) [hereinafter About Revision of Spouse
Deduction]. Nen Zeisei Taikō Wo Kakugi Kettei [Cabinet Decision on Fiscal Year 2005 Taxation
Outline Deduction of Spouse Deduction etc.], NIKKEI SHIMBUN (Dec. 22, 2016, 13:32), http://
blog.goo.ne.jp/kzunoguchi/e/937b9d3c573216bece30277a3bd29bb1?fm=entry_awc(Japan) [hereinafter
Fiscal Year 2005 Taxation].
75.
note 74.

About Revision of Spouse Deduction, supra note 74; Fiscal Year 2005 Taxation, supra

76.

NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 81 (Japan).

77.

Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 8, 1952, Showa 27 (ma) no. 23, 6(9) SAIBANSHO
783, http://www.courts. go.jp (Japan).

SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB]

78.
Saibansho Hou [Japanese Court Act], Law No. 48 of 2013, art. 3(1), translated in
(Japanese Law Translation [JLT DS]), http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp.
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Under the new Japanese Constitution, pre-war family conventions
have survived and have emerged in Japanese courts in several cases. The
Japanese judiciary took part in introducing human rights concepts to the
Japanese people through Articles 14 and 24 of the Japanese Constitution.79
When the constitutionality of statutes, orders, regulations, or their
disposition is in dispute and a precedent is overruled, the Grand Bench of
the Supreme Court reviews the case.80 The Petty Court can review the case,
if it is clear, by referring to Grand Bench decisions.81
Japanese Constitutional Law courses teach that Article 14 of the
Japanese Constitution declares equal opportunities, not equal outcomes.
One explanation is that the classes enumerated under Article 14 of the
Japanese Constitution, which state that there shall be no discrimination in
political, economic, or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social
status, or family origin, have historically been used as justification for
discrimination. 82 Per se distinctions based on these enumerated classes are
presumed to be discriminatory. The government must argue that
differential treatment is reasonably constitutional. 83 However, different
treatment based on the effort and ability of the individual is considered
constitutional.
In other differential treatment, in spite of effort and origin, people are
sometimes in weak or fragile situations. Social rights as provided in
Article 25 of the Japanese Constitution 84 take on the role of assisting
economically fragile people. 85 A person who argues that differential
treatment is unconstitutional takes on the burden of proving that it is
unconstitutional.86

79.

See NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], arts. 14, 24 (Japan).

80.

Id. art. 81.

81.

Id. arts. 80–81.

82.

Id. art. 14.

83.
SATO 2011, supra note 40, at 196, 208; JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Belknap
Press of Harv. U. Press, rev. ed. 1999) (discussing how Rawls theory has been influential on Japanese
constitutional studies).
84.

NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 25 (Japan).

85.
Some Japanese constitutional scholars think Article 25 represents the political agenda with
no legal norm. See SATO 2011, supra note 40, at 363; NONAKA ET AL. I, supra note 40, at 502–03.
86.
Yuichiro Tsuji, Article 9 and the History of Japan’s Judiciary: Examining its Likeness to
American and German Courts, 68 TSUKUBA J.L. & POL. 35 (2016) (Japan); see also SATO 2011, supra
note 40, at 196, 208; NONAKA ET AL. I, supra note 40, at 278.
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The Patricide Case and Article 200 of the Criminal Code

One of the most famous cases, referenced earlier in this paper,
concerns patricide. The case involves a junior high school student who was
repeatedly raped by her own father. 87 Her mother left the house after
learning that her own daughter was pregnant by her husband. 88 The
daughter tried to leave as well, but in vain.89 She had five children as a
result of the rapes, two of whom died.90 Another six were aborted and she
later underwent sterilization.91 When she was twenty-nine, she met a man
at her workplace that she was eager to marry.92 She did not run away at that
point because her sister, who was still living at home, might have been put
in danger.93 Upon telling her father about her work colleague, he became
angry, put her in confinement, and raped her. 94 Eventually, she became
desperate and strangled him.95 At that time, she was twenty-nine years old
and her father was fifty-three years old.96

87.

Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) S AIBANSHO
[SAIBANSHO WEB] 265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan); Charles Qu, Parricide,
Equality and Proportionality: Japanese Courts’ Attitude Towards the Equality Principle as Reflected in
Aizawa v Japan, 8 MURDOCH U. ELECTRONIC J.L. ¶ 4 (2001).
SAIBANREI JŌHŌ

88.

Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) S AIBANSHO
265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan); Qu, supra note 87.

SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB]

89.

Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) S AIBANSHO
265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan); Qu, supra note 87.

SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB]

90.

Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) S AIBANSHO
265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan); Qu, supra note 87.

SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB]

91.

Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) S AIBANSHO
265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan); Qu, supra note 87.

SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB]

92.

Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) S AIBANSHO
265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan); Qu, supra note 87.

SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB]

93.

Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) S AIBANSHO
265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan); Qu, supra note 87.

SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB]

94.

Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) S AIBANSHO
265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan); Qu, supra note 87.

SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB]

95.

Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) S AIBANSHO
265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan); Qu, supra note 87.

SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB]

96.

Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) S AIBANSHO
[SAIBANSHO WEB] 265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan); Yuko Taniguchi, Songoku
Satsujin Ga Kieta Hi [The Day When Patricide Crime Was Disappeared], CHIKUMA SHOCBŌ (1987)
(Japan); Qu, supra note 87.
SAIBANREI JŌHŌ

150

ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 24:1

In 1973, the Grand Bench of the Japanese Supreme Court 97 struck
down Article 200 98 of the Criminal Code. While accepting the law’s
purpose that children should respect parents, the court felt that the penalty
was too harsh to be sustained, as compared to the punishment for regular
murder provided under Article 199.99
Among the fifteen justices who reviewed this decision, Justice Takezo
Shimoda’s dissenting opinion noted that Article 200 should be left to the
legislature, not to the court.100 Six justices concurring still objected to the
majority opinion approving special provisions for patricide.101 At the end,
fourteen justices, with one dissenting, decided the case.102 Eight justices
upheld the court’s reasoning, with six dissenting.103 Accepting this decision
that declared the law unconstitutional, the Ministry of Justice sent an
official notice that Article 199 should be applied, even in cases of
patricide.104
In 1995, Article 200 was deleted by the legislature, after some twenty
years.105 Some conservative members in the ruling party have objected,
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favoring Article 200 of the Criminal Code, even after this decision. 106
Decisions declaring a law unconstitutional under concrete judicial review
do not delete the provisions of the statutes. 107 Under Article 41 of the
Japanese Constitution, the sole and highest organ of the state to pass a bill
is the Diet.108 Therefore, only the legislature can amend statutes at their
own discretion.
This case shows an instance where the Japanese judiciary assumed the
role of introducing the concepts of human rights and equality to the
Japanese people.109
B.

Article 900(iv), Constitutional Order of 1995

The Civil Code governs relationships regarding family and between
couples.110 The first sentence of Article 900, Item iv of the Civil Code,
provides different inheritance distributions between legitimate and
illegitimate children.111
The Japanese judiciary determined Article 900 to be constitutional in
1995. 112 In this case, a girl named Masao Tabata was born in a very
conventional family during the Meiji Constitution era and under the old
Civil Code.113 Her older brother had already passed away.114 Her father
Tonesaku Tabata wanted her to keep his family name, Tabata. 115 His
daughter Masao married four times in attempts to keep the family name and
two of the marriages were considered legal.116

106. Small Committee on Judicial Affairs for Revision of Article 200 of Criminal Code, DIET
(July 17, 1973), http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/071/0081/07107170081003c.html (Japan).
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108.
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110.
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In this particular case, the father adopted Masao’s husband as his
son.117 The second marriage to Gensaku, father of Katsuhiko Fukunishi,
was not considered a legal marriage due to the strong objections of the
father.118 Katsuhiko was born as an illegitimate child between Gensaku and
Masao, but was taken away from them and given to the Fukunishi family.119
The Fukunishi family had no son at that time and Katsuhiko was, in fact,
their sole heir.120 Two years later, the Fukunishi family had a son, and it
became undesirable to adopt Katsuhiko as a legal son.121 The father of the
Fukunishi family acknowledged Katsuhiko as an illegitimate child, even
though the father of Fukunishi was not the biological father.122 Even after
the old Civil Code was amended, the distinction between legitimate and
illegitimate children still remained under Article 900 of the Civil Code.123
Some of the relatives in the Tabata family complained that the child
Katsuhiko should not be eligible to succeed because he left the Tabata
family and his children should not be eligible to succeed to their
grandmother's inheritance.124 They pointed out that the new Civil Code was
very beneficial for the grandchildren of Katsuhiko. 125 Katsuhiko was
discriminated against by his birth family, the Tabatas, because he grew up
with the Fukunishi family, and he was also discriminated against by the
Fukunishi family for being born in the Tabata family.126
The majority of the Supreme Court thought that the distinction
between legitimate and illegitimate was reasonable in so far as it respects
legal marriage and protects illegitimate children, and its distinction was not
clearly or remarkably unreasonable in relation to the legislative purpose.127
It seems that the 1995 order rested on the belief that the inheritance
system was based on the individual, and that the provisions regarding
117.
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118.
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statutory shares of inheritance were designed to operate in a supplementary
way in cases where there is no designation by testament.128 The 1995 order
supported legislative intent in favor of constitutionality through a multitude
of factors. When designing the system, tradition, social environment,
perception of the people, other factors have to be considered, and the
system of inheritance in each country more or less reflects these factors.
Furthermore, a contemporary system of inheritance is closely related to the
idea of family in a given country, and the system cannot be established
without considering the rules of marriage and family in that country. It
should be concluded that the way the inheritance system is established is
left to the reasonable discretion of the legislature by taking all these into
consideration.129
The 1995 order noted: As long as the Civil Code adopts the principle
of legal marriage, the provision gives preferential treatment to the spouse
who has been in a marital relationship with the deceased and his or her
child(ren) in terms of the statutory share in inheritance, while at the same
time, it assures that a child born out of wedlock will have a certain statutory
share in inheritance so as to protect such child.130
This order held that legislative discretion was not excessively
unreasonable in relation to the reason for enacting Article 900 of the Civil
Code, and that it did not exceed the scope of reasonable discretion granted
to the legislature. There were concurring opinions from Justices Itsuo
Sonobe, Tsuneo Kabe, Katsuya Onishi, Hideo Chikusa, and Shinichi
Kawai.131
C. The Dissenting Opinion in the 1995 Order Would Become Mainstream
in the Courts
Justices Toshijirou Nakajima, Masao Ohno, Hisako Takahashi,
Yukinobu Ozaki, and Mistuo Endo wrote dissenting opinions. 132 The
dissenting justices thought that distinction by origin went unconstitutionally
beyond the scope of the legislative purpose of supporting legal marriage
128.

Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 5, 1995, Heisei 3 (kyo) no. 143, 49(7) SAIBANSHO
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and protecting children.133 They explained that Articles 14 and 24 of the
Japanese Constitution set the limitations of legislative discretion.134 These
five dissenting opinions became the majority in the 2013 order.135 They
were of the opinion that the children were subject to uncontrollable
attribution beyond reasonable distinction.136 The purpose of the law and the
means to achieve the distinction should be substantially related.
Reasonableness alone could not be sustained in this case. Supporting
legal marriage might be reasonable, but the distinction between legitimate
and illegitimate children was beyond their will and effort. The distinction
gave the social impression that illegitimate children were inferior to
legitimate children.137 The legislative fact might have been consistent at
that time, but it has changed significantly since then. Social impressions,
changes in foreign countries’ legal systems, domestic movement to amend
the statute or conclude treaty, and changed legislative fact should be
considered when reviewing the provision.138
The dissenting opinion noted that the decision declaring the provision
unconstitutional should not be retroactive in effect because it might infringe
on the legal stability of this case.139 This opinion did not constitute the
majority in 1995. Reading only the majority opinion, and not the dissenting
opinion, it would be doubtful to conclude that the 2013 order referenced
legislative facts in support of constitutionality so much changed that they
were completely lost in the eighteen years since the 1995 order. In the
patricide case, it took twenty-two years before legislative action followed
through.140 Legislative fact theory is a useful tool for a majority of justices
to persuade others. It might be easier for a justice to declare statutes
obsolete and to ask the legislature to revise in order to avoid serious
conflicts with the parliament.
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The 2013 Order That Declared the Provision Unconstitutional

In the 2013 order, ancestor "A" passed away in July 2001, and the
heirs argued that the provisions of Article 900(iv) were unconstitutional
under Article 14 of the Japanese Constitution. 141 The Supreme Court
vacated and remanded the case to the High Court by holding the provisions
in Article 900(iv) unconstitutional.142
The Supreme Court explained that the inheritance system sets rules as
to who is to inherit the property of the decedent, and in order to define the
inheritance system, the circumstances in each country such as the tradition,
social conditions, and public sentiments should be taken into
consideration. 143 Furthermore, since the modern inheritance system is
closely related to the concept of a family, it cannot be defined without
ignoring the rules, people's perceptions, etcetera. regarding marital or
parent-child relationships in the country. It is left to the reasonable
discretion of the legislature to define the inheritance system while
comprehensively considering all these factors. The major issue disputed in
the present case was, within the inheritance system defined in that manner,
whether or not the distinction made by the provision in terms of the
statutory shares in inheritance between children born in wedlock and
children born out of wedlock constituted discriminatory treatment without
reasonable grounds. “If there is no reasonable ground for making such
distinction even when the abovementioned discretionary power vested in
the legislative body is taken into consideration, it is appropriate to construe
that said distinction is in violation of Article 14, paragraph 1 of the
Constitution.”144
Differential treatment relates to the distinction of legal marriage and
de facto marriage. The Japanese Civil Code respects legal marriage over a
de facto marriage.145
The Japanese Civil Code, revised in 1947, abolished the principle that
the eldest son was the head of the family and preserved the right to
succession.146 The code still stated, however, that the statutory share for a
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child born out of wedlock would be one half that of a child born in
wedlock, under Article 900.147
The 2013 Supreme Court Order held that the provision in Article 900,
Item iv of the Civil Code was unconstitutional. 148 The Supreme Court
explained that this provision would control in the absence of a designation
of the shares in inheritance by a will.149 The Supreme Court reviewed the
limits of legislative discretion under Article 14 of the Japanese
Constitution. The factors to review, such as tradition, social conditions, and
public sentiments, would change along with the times.
The judiciary constantly reviews individuals’ dignity and equality
under the law. The facts based on the 1947 Civil Code have changed. In
1947, the prevailing traditional obstacle for equal treatment under the new
constitution was that the eldest son was the head of the family.150 At that
time, when revising the code, the family law system and other systems of
inheritance in other countries were referenced. Since then, circumstances
surrounding legal marriage in Japan have changed in line with changes in
social and economic circumstances, and people's perceptions of marriage
and family have changed as well. People's lifestyles have also changed.
All of these changes brought about the evolution in the inheritance system
in the Civil Code.
Japan ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) in 1979. 151 However, the 1995 order recognized differential
inheritance treatment between children born in wedlock and those born out
of wedlock. 152 The United Nations Human Rights Committee advised
Japan to remove the distinction.153 The 1995 order deemed Article 900 of
the Civil Code to be constitutional. 154 Five justices dissented and
questioned its reasonableness because, by that time, the form of marriage
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and parent-child relationships had already changed.155 The reasonableness
of supporting a distinction between children born in wedlock and those
born out of wedlock was no longer supported.
It was deemed
unconstitutional in July 2001. 156 The reason why the court in the 2013
order used this date is because the Japanese court had exercised judicial
review on this issue in a concrete case in July 2001.157
It is not clear which factors made the court change its perspective, but
Article 900(iv) was held unconstitutional in the 2013 order.158 However, it
did not overrule the 1995 order.159 The losing party made a special appeal
(Tokubetu Koukoku) to the Supreme Court and argued infringement of the
statutes in the case.160 The Court made the decision in a special order.161
The standard of judicial review is puzzling, because the Supreme Court
declared the 1995 order to be unconstitutional but did not overrule it.
Yasuyuki Watanabe explains that not every judicial review holds the
purpose and means to achieve a goal.162 Kazuhiko Ohishi explains that the
general standard of judicial review did not change with the 2013 order and
that only the legislative facts had changed, at least in July 2001, and the
two-step review for the purpose and means to achieve a goal was not used
in the 2013 order.163
One explanation is that legislative fact is included in the Civil Code,
unlike other constitutional decisions,164 in relation to the Criminal Code. In
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cases in which the constitutionality of a certain criminal sanction is
disputed, 165 actions such as conducting unauthorized business are
prosecuted. The court revealed a lack of attention by the legislature, but as
in the 1995 order, changes in legislative fact were helpful to the justices in
asking parliament to amend the Civil Code—to avoid serious conflict and
allow a longer time to amend the statute so as to encourage the legislature
to amend it. However, legal stability regarding predictability may be lost in
making such decisions.166 The 2013 order was based so much on reasoning
surrounding human dignity that it did not even mention the provisions of
the constitution.167
In sum, this 2013 order limited the effect of the unconstitutional
decision by not overruling its precedent. However, there is another way to
restrict its effect by time scale.
E.

Time Limit of the 2013 Order in Declaring A Law Unconstitutional

Three months after the 2013 decision, Article 900(iv) of the Civil
Code was amended in the parliament with a very quick resolution compared
with the patricide case.168 One of the reasons for the quick response was
the effect of a decision declaring a law unconstitutional. The 2013 order
recognized that the unconstitutional conditions began in 2001, sending an
easily understandable message to the legislature.
The Civil Code provides that succession occurs when an ancestor
passes away.169 The new provision of the Civil Code regarding succession
occurred after September 5, 2013.170 The amended provision of the Civil
Code applies only to cases in which there is a legitimate and an illegitimate
child. 171 The Supreme Court held the provision unconstitutional on
KATSUTOSHI TAKAMI, KENPŌ II, CONSTITUTION II 303–05 (2012) (Japan) [hereinafter NONAKA ET AL.
II].
165. NONAKA ET AL. I, supra note 40, at 474–81 (introducing two levels of judicial review); see
also SATO 2011, supra note 40, at 665–71; NOBUYOSHI ASHIBE, KENPŌ [CONSTITUTION] 389 (2015)
(Japan).
166. TSUJIMURA, supra note 33, at 185 (discussing the 2013 order, which emphasized legal
stability but did not mention a purpose or any means to achieve a purpose).
167. Yasue Nukatsuka, Kongaisi Hōtei Sōzokubun Sabetsu Saikōsai Daihōtei Iken Kettei [2013
Unconstitutional Order], 400 HŌGAKU KYŌSITSU 4 (2014).
168.
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September 4, 2013.172 The 2013 order noted a few points for succession
cases that occurred before September 5, 2013.
The court noted that on July 2001 at the latest has no effect on any
legal relationships that have already been fixed by rulings or other judicial
decisions on division of estate, agreements on division of estate or other
agreements, etcetera made on the assumption of the provision of the first
sentence of the proviso to said item with regard to other cases of inheritance
that have commenced during the period after July 2001 until said judgment
is made.173
The Supreme Court reserved several comments on the time scale.
First, Article 900(iv) was unconstitutional for inheritance cases beginning
in July 2001.174 Second, the unconstitutional order did not control decisions
or agreements for distributions of the family court from 2001 to 2013.175
The Ministry of Justice explains that the 2013 order has de facto binding
power.176 The 2013 order applies to similar cases that occur thereafter. In
some cases, partition of inheritance takes time after the ancestor passes
away, even if succession already occurred.
After September 4, 2013, if an heir wanted to fix distribution for a case
in which succession occurred between July 2001 and September 4, 2013,
the distribution between a legitimate child and an illegitimate child would
be the same.177 If the distribution for an heir had already been fixed by an
agreement or judgment, the legal relationships had already been completed,
and the 2013 order would not hold. The Ministry of Justice explains that if
the partition of inheritance is not completed, then the legal relationship is
not yet fixed.178 An order by the family court or an agreement among heirs
completes inheritance and fixes the legal relationship.179 The Ministry of
Justice released a notice to keep legal stability, consistent with this instance
of concrete judicial review.180 The 2013 order restricts the influence of the
Supreme Court order on a time scale, based on legal stability of the family
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relationship once twelve years has passed.181 Thus, it has de facto binding
power.
The legislature has the responsibility to amend a statute after a
decision by the Supreme Court declares it unconstitutional, but the Japanese
Constitution does not specify a reasonable period for the legislature to
amend or abolish a statute.182 The constitution granted legislative power to
the Diet, but legislative inaction might permit a party to ask for damages
under the State Redress Act (Kokka Baishou Hou).183
F.

Nationality Act Decision of 2008

The Supreme Court held Article 3(1) of the Nationality Act184 to be
unconstitutional in 2008. The Supreme Court used the purpose and means
review approach. Here, two cases were decided on the same date—June 4.
In the first case, the child of an unmarried Philippine mother and a Japanese
father submitted an application for nationality to the Ministry of Justice on
the grounds that the child received affiliation through the father after he was
born.185 The ministry denied the application.186
In the second case, a son and a mother were ordered to leave Japan
because they lacked Japanese nationality. 187 Under the Immigration
Control and Refugee Recognition Act, 188 their objections were denied.

181.

See SATO 2011, supra note 40, at 668–69.

182. Id.; see also Yuichiro Tsuji, Law Making Power in Japan—Legislative Assessment in
Japan, 10 KOR. LEGIS. RES. 173 (2016).
183. Kokka Baishou Hou [State Redress Act], Law No. 125 of 1947, art. 1, translated in
(Japanese Law Translation [JLT DS]), http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp.
184. Kokuseki Hou [Nationality Act], Law No. 147 of 1950, art. 3(1), translated in (Japanese
Law Translation [JLT DS]), http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp [hereinafter Kokuseki Hou].
185. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 4, 2008, Heisei 18 (gyo tsu) no. 135, 62(6) SAIKŌ
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 101 (Japan); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 4, 2008, Heisei
19 (gyo tsu) 164, 228 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 101 (Japan).
186.
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They argued that Article 3(1) of the Nationality Act was unconstitutional
under Article 14 of the Japanese Constitution.189
The Japanese Nationality Act uses jus sanguinis to determine
nationality.190 A child has the nationality of his or her father or mother,
regardless of his or her birthplace.191 Article 2 of this act provides that a
child is a Japanese citizen if his or her mother or father is a Japanese citizen
at the time the child is born.192 Article 3(1) permits those under twenty
years of age to acquire legitimate child status through parental marriage or
legal acknowledgment by the father, a process known as “Ninchi” in
Japanese.193
In Japan, the family relationship between a mother and child starts at
birth.194 The child is a legitimate child of the mother.195 Under Article 3(1)
of the Japanese Nationality Act, the father is eligible to acknowledge
(Ninchi) only while the mother is pregnant, in cases where the mother and
father are not married.196 However, illegitimate children may not acquire
Japanese citizenship after birth, even when they are acknowledged by the
father.197 These illegitimate children can acquire Japanese citizenship only
after the mother and father become legally married.198
The Supreme Court majority held that Article 3 of the Nationality Act
was unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of Article 14 of the
Japanese Constitution.199 Article 10 of the Japanese Constitution provides
that Japanese nationality is fixed by statute.200 The Japanese Nationality
Act provides requirements for acquiring or losing Japanese nationality.201
The nation's traditional, political, social, and economic environment
works to fix these requirements of nationality in the legislature. The
distinction caused by the requirements for nationality under the Nationality
Act would be unconstitutional if this distinction were to have no reasonable
189.

Kokuseki Hou, supra note 184, at art. 3.

190.

Id.

191.

Id. art. 2.

192.

Id.

193.

Id. art. 3.

194.

Kokuseki Hou, supra note 184, at art. 3.

195.

Id. art. 3(1).

196.

Id.

197.

Id.

198.

Id.

199.

TSUJIMURA, supra note 33, at 152–66.

200.

NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 10 (Japan).

201.

Kokuseki Hou, supra note 184.
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grounds for justification. If the legislature acts beyond the scope of its
discretion, the judiciary can regard the provision as unconstitutional under
the equal protection clause of Article 14 of the Japanese Constitution.
Japanese nationality is a very important legal status that protects not
only fundamental rights but also one’s eligibility to receive public
assistance. A child who is born cannot change his or her condition—
whether or not the parents are married—by his or her own effort or ability.
In 1984, the Nationality Act was amended to grant Japanese
nationality only after the father and mother got married, apart from the
process of legitimation (Jun-sei).202 On the other hand, children born of a
Japanese father and a non-Japanese mother can receive Japanese nationality
through acknowledgement by the father during the pregnancy of the
mother.203 This amendment works to follow the principle of jus sanguinis.
The legislature was of the opinion that those children who could not acquire
Japanese nationality by nature would be able to establish a “close
relationship” with a foreign country, apart from Japan.204
Article 3(1) of the Japanese Nationality Act used jus sanguinis and the
legal marriage between a Japanese father and a non-Japanese mother to
mean a close relationship with Japan.205 The distinction in Article 3(1) of
the Japanese Nationality Act was based on reasonability of purpose at the
time it was amended in 1984.
In this case, the plaintiff submitted registration for Japanese nationality
in 2003, at which time the legislative argument to support constitutionality
had already been lost.206 The decision to strike down Article 3(1) of the
Japanese Nationality Act as unconstitutional did not mean that all
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provisions, including legitimation, became void in their entirety. 207
Legitimation to cover the principle of jus sanguinis still remained.208
The Supreme Court cited the patricide case and used the purpose and
means to achieve a goal approach.209 A change of legislative fact was one
of the critical factors. Japanese concrete judicial review only addressed the
individual plaintiffs in this case and excluded others in the same position.
In any case, the legislature amended the Japanese Nationality Act in
2008. 210 It is not clear how long the judiciary needs to declare that
legislative facts have changed so as to make a statute obsolete.
IV.

TWO FAMILY LAW DECISIONS IN 2015

In December 2015, the Japanese Supreme Court rendered two
decisions in the area of family law. The Court upheld Article 750 of the
Civil Code as constitutional, requiring a married couple to choose either the
husband’s or the wife’s family name. 211 The Court emphasized the
Japanese tradition of using the same family name for a couple.212 On the
one hand, the Court struck down Article 733 of the Civil Code, which
prohibited women from remarrying within six months of a divorce.213 On
the other hand, the Court stated that a 100-day waiting period was
constitutionally reasonable.214
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Same Surname Decision in 2015

The Supreme Court upheld Article 750 of the Civil Code as
constitutional in December 2015. 215 The plaintiffs sought damages as a
result of legislative inaction to amend Article 750 of the Civil Code. 216
They argued that they had a right not to be forced to change their family
name upon marriage, and that social pressure and discrimination to change
the family name to that of the husband’s family name infringed upon their
equal protection rights under Article 14 of the Japanese Constitution. 217
Those who wanted to keep the wife’s family name could not get married,
which infringed upon the freedom to marry as provided in Article 24 of
Japanese Constitution and also violated the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.218
The Supreme Court responded that the right not to be forced to change
one’s family name is a personal right and a symbol of one’s personality.219
The articles of the Civil Code regulate and control concrete personal rights
in light of the constitution. The Supreme Court thought that it was
inappropriate to argue that being forced to change one’s family name upon
marriage infringed upon the personal rights set forth in the constitution.220
The intent of the articles regulating the family under the Civil Code,
confirming that members using the same surname would belong to the same
family, reflect a fundamental component of society. Their purpose is
constitutionally reasonable. Change of family status is subject to an
individual’s will upon marriage, and thus, females are not forced to give up
their surname against their will.221 The family name has an identification
function in relation to others, and the right to establish or change one’s own
family name depends solely upon one’s own will. A change of surname
upon marriage is expected.
Responding to the argument that it is an infringement of equal rights
under the constitution, the Supreme Court stated that Article 750 did not
discriminate based on gender. No formal unequal treatment was caused by
Article 750 because the majority of couples use the husband’s surname and
215.
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216.
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217.
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218. Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18,
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because husbands and wives discuss and conclude which family name is to
be adopted.222
The Supreme Court explained that the purpose of Article 24 of the
Japanese Constitution, which guarantees the right to choose whether to
marry, whom to marry, and when to marry, is subject to individual
choice.223 On the other hand, Article 750 of the Civil Code addresses the
effects of marriage.224 Giving up a marriage because of Article 750 does
not necessarily lead to an infringement of Article 24 of the constitution.
Married women can use their family name as their common name in their
social lives.
The Supreme Court further explained that Article 24 of the
constitution is only a suggestion and guideline for the legislature.225 The
family is regulated under the general perspective of relationships between
parents and family, and couples are subject to the times in which they live.
These influences include national tradition, social factors, and
circumstances surrounding the family. Personal rights and equal protection
rights take various forms and legislative discretion is very broad. The
means to achieve the goal are further fixed by social status, the environment
in which people are living, and the standpoint of the family as it changes
from time to time.
The judiciary reviews the effects of this system under Article 24 of the
Constitution and reviews the reasonableness of Article 750 in light of
human dignity and equal treatment between males and females. 226 The
same surname tradition was established in 1898.227 It is reasonable to think
that having the same surname is a fundamental component of being a
family. A child born between a husband and a wife using the same
surname is then assumed to be legitimate and protected under their
guardianship.
Five dissenting opinions saw Article 750 of the Civil Code as
unconstitutional. 228 Justice Kiyoko Okabe noted in her opinion that the
number of females working outside the home is increasing and that it is
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reasonable for a woman to keep her family name after marriage.229 Without
exception, the use of a different surname for a woman could cause a loss of
personal identification. The majority of couples using the husband’s
surname reflects the actual power balance in our society. A requirement to
change one’s surname could be unconstitutional in so far as it infringes
upon one’s personal identification and leads to a sense of losing one’s
identity.230 One cannot use an alias in public documents and identification
by an alias versus official name brings about new issues. Women are
participating more and more in society such that the background of the
provision is becoming lost. Losing one’s identity goes against the dignity
of the individual and gender equality under Article 24 of the constitution.231
Furthermore, Justice Okabe emphasized that instances of divorce,
remarriage, non-marriage, and late marriage are increasing and that the
function of the surname is being lost.232
Justice Michiyoshi Kiuchi argued in his dissenting opinion that Article
750 of the Civil Code should be unconstitutional because at least one
person in the couple is obligated to give up his or her surname.233
Justice Kiuchi doubts that the sense of being a family member is
cultivated through the same surname.234 Children are not born with a sense
of whether they have the same surname as other family members. Having
the same surname is not proof of a relationship between a child and a parent
or of being a married couple.
Justice Yoshiki Yamaura concurred with Justice Okabe and noted that
the Diet has the responsibility to amend Article 750.235 He referenced a
Korean Constitutional Court decision that held a similar provision in Korea
to be unconstitutional.236 The same opinion has also been referenced by the
Commission of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women.237
This decision was controversial among Japanese constitutional
scholars. The scholars criticized the majority for allowing broad legislative
229.
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discretion and denying personal rights that are protected under the
constitution. A name signifies a person under a legal system, which leads
to attachment to that name.238
The Court explained that a surname has meaning as an individual’s
name, because the family name and the first name work together to identify
a person in society.239 Scholars criticized the majority opinion by stating
that the family name belongs to society. A certain uniform standard is
needed. Unlike the first name, a family name has an important function in
recognizing members of “one” family.240 A surname is assumed to change
when family relationships change in instances such as marriage.241 Thus,
Article 750 is related to personal rights protected under Article 13 of the
constitution.
Kazuyuki Takahashi explains that a name is used to identify oneself in
social life. 242 Recognizing the vital function of people living with
autonomy in social life, this constitutional right is guaranteed. Takahashi
opines that the Court should have analyzed whether there is a legitimate
public interest in changing a surname. 243 The majority opinion
distinguished the surname from the first name, stating that a surname is
granted by the government but is not guaranteed as a human right.244 For
Takahashi, this was an arbitrary interpretation.245
The legislature has discussed revising Article 750 since 1996. 246
Former Justice Tokuji Izumi argued that the mission of the judiciary had
been abandoned because the cabinet did not propose a bill and the
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legislature did not amend the law, leading the plaintiff to take the issue to
court in this case.247
The majority opinion must have responded by saying that Article 750
conflicts with the ICCPR.248 Miyoko Tsujimura was disappointed that the
court did not mention the ICCPR and thinks that, in the future, the Court
will allow all people to retain their surnames after getting married if they so
choose.249 The right of a married couple to use separate surnames is within
the legislature’s discretion.250
B.

Prohibition of Remarriage Decision in 2015

The Supreme Court 251 held Article 733(1) 252 to be unconstitutional
beyond the 100-day waiting period. In this case, the wife-plaintiff divorced
her former husband in 2008 because of domestic violence and because she
was pregnant by her current partner.253 She needed to wait for six months
after the divorce before she could remarry. 254 In 2011, she claimed
emotional damage, resulting from legislative inaction to amend Article 772
of the Civil Code, in the Okayama District Court.255 The district court and

247. Tokuji Izumi, Concerning the Japanese Public’s Evaluation of Supreme Court Justices,
88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1769, 1777 (2011). All fifteen justices of the Supreme Court are selected from
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appointed by the cabinet. Id. These appointments are left to the autonomy of the judiciary to some
extent. Id.; Court System of Japan: Judges, SUP. CT. JAPAN 10, http://www.courts.go.jp/english/
judicial_sys/Court_System_of_Japan/index.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2017) (explaining that for lower
court judges, the Supreme Court names nominees and submits the list to the cabinet). For instance,
Tokuji Izumi is a career judge. Izumi, supra note 247, at 1777–78 (explaining a career judge’s opinion
does not necessarily conform to conservative opinion).
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the Hiroshima High Court held the requirement to be constitutional.256 The
plaintiffs argued that this provision was unconstitutional under Articles 14
and 24 of the Japanese Constitution. 257 The Legislative Council of the
Ministry of Justice advised in 1996 that Article 733 should provide a 100day waiting period, but conservative members of the Diet prevented an
amendment to Article 733.258
It is necessary to examine Article 772 259 before analyzing Article
733(1). Article 772 of the Civil Code provides for three scenarios
regarding the status of a child.260 First, a child conceived during marriage is
presumed to be the child of the husband.261 Second, a child born within 300
days after divorce is presumed to be the child of the divorced husband.262
Third, a child born after remarriage is presumed to be the child of the new
husband.263
When a wife gets a divorce and remarries immediately, a child born
within 200 days after the divorce would be presumed to be the child of the
ex-husband and not of the new husband. 264 Therefore, the period of
prohibition of remarriage was provided for in Article 733(1). 265 A
duplication of presumptions occurs from the 201st to the 300th day, but
Article 733 prohibited remarriage for a six-month period in any event.266
In December 2015, the majority opinion of the Supreme Court held
that the purpose of Article 733(1) is to avoid duplication of the presumption
of paternity so as to prevent paternity-related disputes.267 At the time the
Civil Code was drafted, during the Meiji Constitution era, it was considered
256.
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MINPŌ [Civ. C.] art. 733 (Japan).
259.
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reasonable to impose a remarriage ban of six months, which is longer than
the present 100 days, not only for the couple but also in the interest of the
child.
The legislature generally regulates family and couple relationships by
taking into consideration national tradition, social factors, and
circumstances surrounding the family. Article 24 of the Japanese
Constitution sets limits on legislative discretion.268 The judiciary reviews
provisions in light of their reasonableness to sustain the constitutionality of
these provisions as established by the legislative branch. Today, as medical
technology develops, this foundation is being lost. The Supreme Court said
that imposing a 100-day waiting period was reasonable and appropriate but
imposing a period beyond 100 days would be unconstitutional and
unreasonable.269
Justices Ryuko Sakurai, Katsumi Chiba, Takehiko Ohtani, Yoshinobu
Ohnuki, Naoto Ohtani, and Tsuneyuki Yamamoto wrote concurring
opinions.270 They agreed with the majority that a waiting period of 100
days was constitutional under Article 14 or 24(2) of the Japanese
Constitution. 271 They believed that the prohibition period should be as
short as possible.272 Even within 100 days, the prohibition of remarriage
must be lifted in certain cases.273 The purpose of Article 733 was thought
to be sustained as long as it avoided a presumption of two fathers and
prevented disputes regarding paternity.274
The lack of presumption of paternity is not limited to cases where a
child is born within 100 days under Article 733(2). 275 There are cases
where the biological mother was too old to be pregnant or paternity was not
presumed, because the husband was missing for three years. 276

268.

NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 24 (Japan).

269.

Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 16, 2015, Heisei 25 (o) no. 1079, 69(8) SAIBANSHO
SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 2427, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan).
270. Id. (Sakurai, J., Chiba, J., T. Ohtani, J., Ohnuki N. Ohtani, J., & Yamamoto, J.,
concurring).
271.
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Ohtani, J., Ohnuki N. Ohtani, J., & Yamamoto, J., concurring).
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Additionally, when the wife has undergone sterilization, it is clear that she
cannot bear a child.277
When the couple registers a marriage, the officer reviews only the
formal documentary items. 278 Thus, new couples must file medical
evidence to rebut a presumption of paternity by the former husband if the
woman has been previously married.279
Justice Kaoru Onimaru opined that all of Article 733 was
unconstitutional because the overlap of the presumption occurs only in
exceptional and limited cases.280 Even though the purpose of Article 733 is
legitimate, a uniform prohibition to cover rare cases is too broad to
maintain reasonableness under Articles 14 and 24 of the Japanese
Constitution. 281 Clear and simple regulations should be prepared by the
legislature for family and couple relationships.
Justice Michiyoshi Kiuchi explained that scientific DNA data analysis
can objectively clarify paternity. 282 Therefore, a prohibition period for
remarriage to prevent confusion of paternity is no longer meaningful.
Justice Yoshiki Yamaura’s dissenting opinion argued that Article
733(2) restricts women through a legal technique to prevent the
presumption of fatherhood.283 There are very few instances where a woman
bears a child where the question of paternity overlaps with the former and
the new husband. A prohibition covering all women is meaningless. An
individual remedy for children should be provided by the legislature.
Justice Yamaura showed how a South Korean Constitutional Law Court
held a similar provision of the Civil Code to be unconstitutional in 2005.284
The remarriage prohibition and the same surname decision in 2015
illustrates several points. First, the judiciary will refrain from acting
beyond legislative discretion and restricts the scope of its decisions on
unconstitutionality. It should provide guidelines for the legislature to
follow in amending laws when necessary. The members of the Diet are not
legal experts. A simpler and easier message would be helpful for them to
react to court decisions. In this case, the court struck down the additional
eighty days as unconstitutional and held that a waiting period of 100 days
277.
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278.

Id.

279.

Id.

280.

Id.
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was constitutional. 285 The parliament should modify Article 733
immediately. Even though technology continues to develop, paternity
disputes lead to litigation costs that can still be burdensome for the general
public.286
Second, the minority opinion of the Supreme Court is not critical to
the parties in these particular cases, but over time, it could function as the
majority opinion. Constitutional law scholars have the responsibility to
disseminate these opinions throughout Japan.
C.

Local Government and Same Sex Marriage

Under Article 24 of the Japanese Constitution, the phrase “the mutual
consent of both sexes” is subject to interpretation.287 If this language means
both females and males, it would be unconstitutional to admit same-sex
marriage. Otherwise, it would be constitutional to read that “of both sexes”
means “of two parties.” This interpretation would prohibit polygamy.
Several decisions of the Japanese Supreme Court show that it takes a
long time to pass or amend statutes in the Diet. Article 41 of the Japanese
Constitution provides that legislative power belongs solely to the Diet.288
Deliberations in parliament under constitutionalism shall consider the
opinions of the minority, marginalized people, and freedom of speech as
these are channeled between the legislature and the people.
When the deliberative floor of central Tokyo does not work well, the
local government might be a model for the Diet. Chapter 8 of the Japanese
Constitution provides for local self-government. 289 A local government
may pass ordinances for regions within its jurisdiction, but not for all of
Japan’s territory.

285. See KOJI TONAMI, KENPŌ [CONSTITUTION] 433 (Gyosei 1999) (Japan); see also Anzai
Fumio, Sihū sinsa to rippou sairyou ron [Judicial Review and Legislative Discretion] 47(1) RIKKYŌ
HŌGAKU [ST. PAUL’S REV. L. POL.] 10, 10 (1997) (Japan); Hidemori Tomatsu, Hū no moto no byoudū
ni kakawaru hanrei riron [Decision Theory on Equality Under the Law], in TOMATSU & NOSAKA,
KENPŌ SOSHŪ NO GENJŪ BUNSEKI [ANALYSIS ON THE PRESENT STATE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
LITIGATION] 190, 190 (2012) (Japan).
286. TSUJIMURA, supra note 33, at 245. Tsujimura feels that the court’s opinion neglects the
minority; other remedies should be prepared by the legislature. Id.
287.
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In 2015, Shibuya ward passed an ordinance to deal with relationships
of same-sex couples in the same way as legal marriage.290 The reason for
passing this ordinance was that some lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender (LGBT) couples could not rent rooms and were prevented from
visiting their partners in the hospital for medical checkups or other
procedures. 291 Shibuya ward approved eight couples and issued them
registration documents.292
In Setagaya ward, the mayor issued a protocol for the registration of
same-sex couples as partnerships. 293
Twenty-nine couples have
registered. 294 Yokohama city opened space for members of the LGBT
community to communicate.295 In Chiba city, more than fifty percent of
citizens are projected to register as same-sex couples.296
Registered same-sex couples do not receive the same tax and
inheritance treatment as legally married couples. 297 These ordinances
motivate the Diet to pass relevant statutes, although strong conservative
members object to amending the Japanese Constitution.
290. Shibuya-ku Danjo Byodo Oyobi Tayo-sei o Soncho Suru Shakai o Suishin Suru Jorei
[Shibuya Ward Ordinance to Promote a Society that Respects Gender Equality and Diversity],
https://www.city.shibuya.tokyo.jp/kusei/jorei/jorei/lgbt.html (Japan); see Shibuya-ku Danjo Byodo
Oyobi Tayo-sei o Soncho Suru Shakai o Suishin Suru Jorei [Shibuya Ward Ordinance to Promote a
Society that Respects Gender Equality and Diversity], Ordinance of 2015, pmbl., art. 10,
https://www.city.shibuya.tokyo.jp/kusei/jorei/jorei/pdf/danjo_tayosei.pdf (Japan) [hereinafter Shibuya];
see also Shibuya-ku danjo byōdō oyobi tayō-sei o sonchō suru shakai o suishin suru jōrei ni tsuite no
shōsasshi [Regulations to Promote a Society that Respects Gender Equality and Diversity in Shibuyaku] (2015), https://www.city.shibuya.tokyo.jp/kusei/jorei/jorei/pdf/lgbt_sasshi.pdf (Japan) [hereinafter
Shibuya Booklet].
291. Shibuya Booklet, supra note 290; see also Meg Murphy, Tokyo’s Setagaya Ward to Begin
Legally Recognizing Same-sex Partnerships, JAPANTODAY (July 31, 2015, 7:00 AM), https://japan
today.com/category/national/tokyos-setagaya-ward-to-begin-legally-recognizing-same-sex-partnerships.
292. See Shusuke Murai, Tokyo’s Shibuya and Setagaya Wards Issue First Same-Sex
Partnership Papers, JAPAN TIMES (Nov. 5, 2015), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/11/05/
national/social-issues/shibuya-set-issue-first-certificates-recognizing-sex-couples/#.Wf-3VROPLow.
293. Dousei Pa-tona-sippu Nitsuite [About the Setagaya Ward Same-Sex Partnership Oath]
(2017), SETAGAYA-KU [SETEGAYA CITY], http://www.city.setagaya.lg.jp/kurashi/101/167/1871/d00
142701.html (Japan) [hereinafter Setagaya].
294. Murai, supra note 292. Unlike Shibuya ordinance, Setagaya ward issues a certificate
under inner guideline. Id. See also Shibuya, supra note 290; Setagaya, supra note 293.
295. LGBT: “Yokohama Diversity Parade” Walking with Smiles, MAINICHI NEWSPAPERS
(Oct. 15, 2016, 17:26), http://mainichi.jp/articles/20161016/k00/00m/040/012000c (Japan).
296. Justin McCurry, Tokyo’s Shibuya Ward is First in Japan to Recognize Same-sex
Marriage, TOKYO SHIMBUN (Mar. 31, 2015, 7:50 PM), http://www.tokyonp.co.jp/article/national/list
/201604/CK2016041202000250.html.
297.

MINPŌ [Civ. C.] arts. 731–49.
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THE FUNCTION OF A DECISION THAT STRIKES DOWN A LAW AS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL

V.

In Japan, the effect of a decision on the constitutionality of a law
applies only to the litigants in the case under concrete judicial review. The
decision on the unconstitutionality of a law by the Supreme Court has no
function to automatically delete the provisions at issue because the lawmaking power belongs solely to the Diet. The drafting history of the
Japanese Constitution shows that there was serious concern over leaving
absolute power to the judiciary. The concern was over the issue of where
sovereign power should reside.
Although a decision on the unconstitutionality of a law only binds the
parties and the government in a particular case, it must be respected by the
other branches of government. As in Article 200 of the Criminal Code, the
prosecutor applied the provision governing regular murder, Article 199 and
not Article 200, for a murder case where a child killed his or her parents
after the Supreme Court had rendered its decision on the relevant case.298
Soon after the remarriage prohibition case in 2015, the Ministry of
Justice notified municipalities to accept marriage registrations as early as
100 days after a divorce.299 The legislature must respect decisions on the
unconstitutionality of a law and rapidly amend or abolish the pertinent
provisions. However, it took twenty-two years to amend the relevant
statutes in the patricide case.
These cases illustrate some of the obstacles in the floor deliberations
of the Diet. There is no specific time limit obligating the legislature to
amend or abolish statutes under the Japanese Constitution, although the
Supreme Court indicates some guidelines for legislative action.
Decisions on the unconstitutionality of a law are retroactive only for
litigants and do not generally hold for other cases under concrete judicial
review and Article 41, as the Diet has the sole law-making power.
By analyzing the scope of the decisions on the unconstitutionality of
various laws, it might be possible to distinguish criminal from civil and
administrative cases. In criminal law, court decisions generally apply
retroactively, but final decisions would not automatically invalidate other
past decisions. In administrative or civil law cases, decisions in general do
not apply retroactively.
298.
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The Supreme Court announces decisions on the unconstitutionality of
a law, and sends them to the cabinet and the Diet. This means that the
decision should hold for similar cases in the future. Judicial review under
the Japanese Constitution is a concrete rather than an abstract review. The
application of a decision on the unconstitutionality of a law means that the
application of that law to the specific facts of a concrete case will be
unconstitutional even as the text of the statute on its face remains
constitutional.300
Regarding Article 900(iv), the order that rendered the provision
unconstitutional in 2013, limited its effect to a specified time scale on the
ground that the legal stability of family relationships for inheritance
purposes needed to be maintained. 301 If the distribution to an heir was
already fixed by an agreement or judgment, the legal relationship would be
complete. The 2013 order did not overrule the 1995 constitutional order,
but it managed to maintain legal stability through the uniform treatment of
families—preventing confusion with other family relationships.302
These decisions did not set forth a time limit for the legislature to act.
In subsequent analyses, when voting on disparity cases, the Japanese
Supreme Court reached decisions on the unconstitutionality of laws, even
as these provisions remained effective through the Administrative
Litigation Act. 303 In 1976, the Supreme Court adopted the Iken-Jotai
condition doctrine for the first time by invoking Article 31(1) of the
Administrative Case Litigation Act in an action for revocation of an
administrative decision. 304 It used an application by analogy method,
known as Jijo Hanketsu. 305 The 1976 decision rejected the claim that

300. Saikō Saibanashō [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 28, 1962, Showa 30(o) no. 2961, 16 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO
KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 1593 (Japan) (involving confiscation of the property of third parties, this
was a controversial decision as to whether the law at issue was unconstitutional on its face or in its
application); see also SATO 2011, supra note 40, at 671; NONAKA ET AL. II, supra note 164, at 323,
332(c).
301. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 4, 2013, Heisei 24 (kyo) no. 985, 67(6) SAIBANSHO
SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 1320, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan).
302.

Id.

303. Yuichiro Tsuji, Vote Value Disparity and Judicial Review, SINGAPORE L. REV.
(forthcoming 2016).
304. Gyousei Jiken Soshō Hou [Administrative Case Litigation Act.], Act no. 139 of 1962, art. ġ
31, translated in (Japanese Law Translation [JLT DS]), http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp
/law/detail/?id=1922&vm=04&re=02 (Japan).
305.

Id.
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Article 219 of the Public Officer Election Act clearly prohibited the
application of Article 31(1) of the Administrative Case Litigation Act.306
The Supreme Court explained that parliament must address
unconstitutional states or conditions within a reasonable time.307 If it fails
to do so, the judiciary can make a determination of unconstitutionality.
Today, lower courts can declare unconstitutionality in cases of voting
disparities. In the disparity voting case referenced above, the effect was not
retroactive for the litigants.
Dissenting or concurring opinions are not critical as precedent to bind
future cases, but they play the role of sending a message to other
government branches. For the cases involving Article 733 of the Civil
Code, the dissenting opinion of Yamaura noted that, under the Meiji
Constitution, the old patriarchy had been maintained in the Civil Code,
while Justice Kiuchi suggested the availability of advanced medical
technology.308 Additionally, after the decisions on the unconstitutionality
of the law but before amendment by the legislature, the Ministry of Justice
ordered the office of municipalities to accept marriage registrations just 100
days after divorce.309 As in the patricide case, the conservative members of
parliament are reluctant to respond in some cases.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Under the Meiji Constitution, women did not enjoy the same rights as
men. Female suffrage was not recognized and women could not form
associations or take part in the parliament. Under the old Civil Code, only
the eldest son succeeded to the property of the family.
A young American lady who was raised in Japan suggested an
advanced proposal for equal rights after working with the GHQ. The
Japanese government, however, rejected her proposal because they
referenced traditions that did not exist in Japan.
The Japanese Constitution provides for equal rights in Articles 14 and
24 by stating that marriage shall be based only on the mutual consent of

306. Koshoku Senkyo Hou [Japanese Public Officer Election Act], Act no. 100 of 1952, art.
219, translated in (Japanese Law Translation [JLT DS]), http://www.japanese lawtranslation.go.jp
(Japan).
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both sexes, and that it shall be maintained through mutual cooperation on
the basis of equal rights between the husband and the wife.310
The constitution governs the relationship between the government and
private citizens. The judiciary uses the constitution in some cases to
invalidate contracts between companies and laborers.
There are
controversies with regard to whether constitutional norms directly apply to
relationships among private citizens.
In 1986, three major statutes to guarantee equal protection were
passed, impacting the fields of labor and national pension.311
Decisions of the judiciary have been influential as a remedy for
unequal treatment in conventional family law. Under concrete judicial
review, the judiciary sends messages to the legislature to revise statutes.
Article 41 declares that the sole law-making organ is the Diet, so the
judiciary cannot amend the statutes being reviewed. 312 Under concrete
judicial review, the judgment only applies to the parties in litigation. In the
patricide case, the Ministry of Justice did not prosecute under the article in
question in similar cases.
In the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children, the
Supreme Court held Article 900 to be constitutional in 1995.313 This case
shows that conventional customs survive even under the current Japanese
Constitution. Dissenting opinions argued that children cannot choose their
parents and are subject to uncontrollable attributions.314 Decisions on the
unconstitutionality of a law may cause other similar family relationship
issues. The dissenting justice proposed that the decision should not be
retroactive, but this proposal did not receive the support of the majority.315
In 2013, the Supreme Court announced by order that Article 900 was
unconstitutional. 316 The Grand Bench of the Supreme Court called all
fifteen justices to change precedent and determine the constitutionality of
the order and statutes.317 The 2013 order did not overrule the 1995 order.
310.
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The 2013 order noted that Article 900 would control in the absence of a
designation of the shares of inheritance by a will and pointed out that some
factors to limit legislative discretion such as tradition, social conditions and
public sentiment, would change along with the times.318 First, this order
shows that dissenting opinions may subsequently become mainstream in
Japanese family law decisions.
Second, the Court may reveal a lack of attention by the legislature.
The judiciary is obligated to constantly review statutes and hold them
unconstitutional if the legislative facts that supported the statutes have
changed. Recommending a change of legislative fact is a helpful tool to
receive majority support among justices, thus avoiding serious conflicts and
delays in amending the statute. It also encourages the legislature to amend
statutes. However, legal stability may be sacrificed through such decisions.
The 1995 order supported legislative fact in favor of constitutionality by
making reference to several influences including tradition, social
environment, perception of the people, and other factors. Justices do not
have to change the general standard of judicial review but can depend on
changed legislative fact.
Third, the Ministry of Justice can quickly respond when it receives
understandable messages from the judiciary. This limits the scope of an
order declaring similar cases unconstitutional. The judiciary cannot state a
specific time limit for the legislature to amend a statute. The 2008 decision
under the Nationality Act shows that the judiciary may review legislative
purpose and the means a law uses to achieve a goal even when that goal is
not yet clear.319 This decision supported the legislative fact carried forward
from1984 even though it had been lost by 2008. It is not clear how long it
will take for the judiciary to declare that a legislative fact has changed and
that statutes are now obsolete. A 2015 decision also upheld the article in
the Civil Code addressing surnames for couples. 320 The Supreme Court
stated that family traditions have not changed so much to allow the
judiciary to declare this provision unconstitutional. 321 Constitutional law
scholars are mainly against this decision. Another 2015 decision held
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Article 733(1) to be unconstitutional regarding limitations on remarriage.322
In this case, national tradition, social factors, and other circumstances
contributed to the decision.323 This case shows that a judicial decision can
be used as a guideline for the legislature to amend a statute in question in a
certain way.
Fourth, while a minority opinion of the Supreme Court may not be
critical for the parties to the case at bar, it can function as a majority
opinion in the future.
Fifth, several decisions of the Japanese Supreme Court show that it
takes the Diet a significant amount of time to pass or amend a statute.
Local government initiatives can serve as models for statutes in the Diet.
The decisions of the Supreme Court have led the dialogue on how
couples and families should act in Japanese society. The judiciary can gain
trust as a fair umpire of the general public discourse through the
persuasiveness of its decisions. Tradition, legislative discretion, and
legislative fact are some of the interpretive tools that judges may use.
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